Beyond Memoris #4: Decision Making

As early as 1991, Intel embraced the PC user as ultimate consumer and arbiter of PC technology. This was somewhat surprising for a PC (vs. Mac) world company, and even more so for a chip maker. The strategy was at the heart of the Intel Inside program, which funded PC advertising that contributed heavily to the adoption S curve, and into which Intel invested billions.  

It often came to my research “minions” (see encounter #2) to understand potential PC "consumers", what would and would not interest various segments, to inform Intel decision making.  We tested everything from TV ads to product concepts.  One day, the head of engineering asked us to test an idea he and his team had been working on that he thought could revolutionize the PC industry and Intel’s business model.  It could very well be the next disruptive innovation.

I had some hesitation that this was a request for ‘research to make a point’ vs. ‘research to make a decision’, a distinction often articulated by my always astute colleague, Karen Alter.  With assurances to the contrary, we proceeded with research design, data collection and finally, analysis.  When the results suggested that the proposal was at odds with consumer wants and needs at the time, we ran a conceptual replication to be certain the results were not a fluke.  But still the research suggested that in the eyes of consumers, this strategy would be a leap in the wrong direction.  The strategy offered consumers complexity when they longed for simplicity.  

In those days, projects of this magnitude were subjected to three hour Group Strategic Reviews (GSRs).  Senior vice presidents generally presented; Andy Grove and the rest of the management team presided, debated and made a decision on whether and how to proceed.  The session on this project started with a basic proposal that included the objectives and the requirements: time, $, staffing.  The head of engineering then summarized the research findings.  

At that point, Andy Grove stopped the presenter in his tracks.

“Let me get this straight. This is going to require five years of heavy engineering, X millions if not billions in development costs, and consumers are not just uninterested, they are actively opposed to the outcome?  Moreover if I understand the proposal, it destroys our current business model and offers no feasible alternative.”

Despite the ensuing protestations to the contrary, Andy was clear that he and the management team had the data it needed to make an informed decision. He polled the team, who agreed that the project should be killed. He looked at his watch, noted that it was just 10 minutes into a three hour meeting, and expressed his hope that everyone around the table could enjoy the newly found two hours and fifty minutes in their schedule.  

Andy paid more attention to information than claims, even when the claims were offered by incredible technologists who he respected.  He was decisive and understood opportunity as well as costs.  He valued his and other people’s time, so that when a decision could be made, it was.   

In this case, his behavior was a demonstration of another learning from his management class, blindingly obvious but nevertheless prescient:

• Consider the consequences of accomplishing a strategic goal -- will success achieve the intended results?